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I N T E R N A L CONTROL A N D
AUDITING IN S M A L L BANKS

Thomas Y. Hartley
Partner, Columbus Office
Presented before the
Central Ohio Chapter,
Bank Administration Institute,
Columbus-April 1974

The following remarks are devoted to a review of the purpose of audits, what
they are trying to accomplish, how they relate to internal control and what a
small bank might do to establish or improve an audit program.
PURPOSE
The purpose of auditing in banks, large and small, is to insure accurate
presentation of financial statements, including the balance sheet and the
results of operations. Accurate financial statements are important in
safeguarding the stability of a bank, protecting the depositors and informing
owners and management of operating results. The various regulators are also
interested in protecting the depositor and insuring overall public confidence
in the banking and monetary system. These regulators include the Federal
Reserve System, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation and the various state supervisors. Accordingly, banks
are constantly involved with broad-brush audits which are performed
primarily to determine overall financial stability. In addition to the audits
done by the regulators, other audit work should be done. This can be
accomplished using internal audit staffs, outside CPAs or some combination
of the two.
I N T E R N A L CONTROL
The most important way to provide adequate protection for a bank is not
by the use of auditing but through the establishment and maintenance of
appropriate accounting controls. Many think of internal controls as those
expensive, often impractical suggestions made by an auditor or examiner as a
result of completing a "yes/no" checklist or questionnaire and that are
received less than enthusiastically by management. However, bank management has really been involved in internal control for years in many ways.
Since the bank's product in the marketplace is money, the commodity
most susceptible to fraudulent manipulation, the banking industry has long
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been concerned with controls. While most of these relate to controlling cash,
others are also necessary relating to accounting records. Controls must be
realistic and practical. This point is emphasized in the language that the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants recommends be used in
reports on auditors' evaluations of internal accounting controls:
The objective of internal accounting control is to provide reasonable, but not
absolute, assurance as to the safeguarding of assets against loss from unauthorized use
or disposition, and the reliability of financial records for preparing financial
statements and maintaining accountability for assets. The concept of reasonable
assurance recognizes that the cost of a system of internal accounting control should
not exceed the benefits derived and also recognizes that the evaluation of these
factors necessarily requires estimates and judgments by management.
There are inherent limitations that should be recognized in considering the
potential effectiveness of any system of internal accounting control. In the
performance of most control procedures, errors can result from misunderstanding of
instructions, mistakes of judgment, carelessness, or other personal factors. Control
procedures whose effectiveness depends upon segregation of duties can be circumvented by collusion. Similarly, control procedures can be circumvented intentionally
by management with respect either to the execution and recording of transactions or
with respect to the estimates and judgments required in the preparation of financial
statements. Further, projection of any evaluation of internal accounting control to
future periods is subject to the risk that the procedures may become inadequate
because of changes in conditions, and that the degree of compliance with the
procedures may deteriorate.
1

To obtain a clearer picture of internal controls, how they work and what
they do, let us explore the classes of errors and how they come about, and
some of the available controls.
• Kinds of Error. There are two classes of errors: intentional, fraudulent acts
with the intent to steal funds or improve financial results and unintentional
errors resulting from mistakes or oversights.
A common misconception is that audits are performed only to discover
defalcations—fraudulent acts. This is one purpose but far from the most
important. A n audit program that is designed to catch errors in tellers' cash
funds or correspondent bank accounts, while overlooking the fact that the
worthless status of a significant portion of the loan portfolio (regardless of
whether intentionally hidden) threatens the very solvency of the bank, is a
poorly conceived and directed audit program.
1. Committee on Auditing Procedure, "Reports on Internal Control," Statement on
Auditing Procedure No. 49 (New York: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1971), pp. 178-79.
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Unintentional errors include such things as improper recognition of
monthly unearned interest income on instalment loans, improper computation of interest income on early loan payoffs, incorrect savings account or
CD interest expense computations or various mispostings to income and
expense accounts—innocent mistakes that could result in loss to the bank or
inaccurate financial statement presentation. This is the kind of error most
often overlooked in designing control systems, but it is certainly a
responsibility of management.
More familiar are the intentional errors, especially those resulting from
defalcations or fraud—such things as teller cash shortages; missing securities;
unauthorized disbursements; unauthorized or fictitious loans to employees,
officers or related parties; improper savings account withdrawals and the like.
Most people in the banking business have come into contact with one or more
of these situations.
The intentional errors just listed are known as temporary concealments. In
every fraud there must be opportunity—i.e., access to cash, securities,
etc.—and in addition the ability to conceal. The teller who takes cash from
her fund has perpetrated a fraud but has no way to conceal it permanently. A
future count of her fund will expose the shortage. This is also true if she takes
cash and prepares a ticket to record a withdrawal from an uncontrolled
inactive savings account. A little more imagination has been shown, but the
concealment is still temporary and can be exposed when the saver comes in to
withdraw funds or the account is confirmed. A fictitious loan made by an
employee or officer is also concealed only temporarily. Not only is there a
loan to a fictitious customer, but the interest and principal payments must be
kept current to avoid detection, and this often leads to additional false loans
to continue the concealment.
Unfortunately, there are also methods of concealment that can be
considered permanent. A n unauthorized check may be written for personal
use and charged to an expense account where it will go unnoticed. A more
complex example is the underrecording of the interest income due the bank
on an early loan payoff by reducing the amount of the cash receipt ticket and
pocketing the additional amount received. There is nothing left to be
discovered if the undercharging of interest is not detected, because the
income of the bank is understated and this is not likely to be noticed.
• Segregation of Duties. It can be seen that in designing a system of internal
control an attempt should be made to segregate the duties of employees in
such a way that a person with access to assets does not have the related
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recording responsibilities. For example, an employee who prepares disbursement checks should not prepare the cash disbursements records or reconcile
the outstanding checks with the account balance. A n employee who can
make a loan should not have the authority to write off bad accounts without
independent review and approval, so that he cannot subsequently write off
bad loans made to himself.
These segregations of duties are easy to arrange in large banks with enough
employees so that jobs can be divided according to a systematic plan of
control. Too many small banks use their size as an excuse for lack of a system
of internal control. This is really not a good excuse. It is management's
responsibility to provide an effective system of accounting control regardless
of size.
By exercising some imagination there are many things that can be done to
divide responsibilities within the small bank. Tellers and other employees can
be used periodically to perform certain unrelated tasks to provide control.
Tellers can be used on a rotating basis to reconcile correspondent bank
accounts. Cash funds can be rotated among tellers periodically. Detailed
ledgers can be run and agreed to controls by different employees each time
on a random rotation selected by an officer. Custody records for securities
can be maintained by an employee without any other related securities
functions. A little thought will suggest any number of effective ways to
segregate specific duties.
ROLE OF AUDITING
Since the primary defense against errors (intentional and unintentional) is
internal control, auditing should be used to insure that controls do exist and
that they are effective. This is done by testing—independent work performed
to determine whether the internal system of control is functioning. Where
adequate controls over particular functions do not exist, proper auditing
technique requires that enough additional testing work be done to reveal any
errors that may have occurred.
In carrying out independent confirmation and verification of securities,
bank accounts, certificates of deposit, loans, checking accounts, etc., auditors
are testing the accuracy of accounts to determine whether controls are
effective, and in some cases they are performing these tests on an expanded
basis because no controls exist over certain of these operations. When
returned checks are compared with supporting documents for proper
authorization and proper recording, compliance with existing control
procedures is again being tested.
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The functions of internal audit can be performed in smaller banks by
establishing a program for examination of transactions on a test basis at
different times during the year. Depending upon the size of the bank, the
testing can be performed by an officer with the assistance of selected
employees on a part-time basis, by outside auditors or by full-time auditors.
The important thing is that controls must be established and periodically
examined for effectiveness, and items not under control must be thoroughly
tested. These steps are taken to detect errors, whether intentional or
unintentional, so that financial statements are correctly presented and to
insure the financial stability of the bank by safeguarding its assets.
Every bank, regardless of size, should have at the least a basic audit
program. This can be accomplished by laying out the steps to be taken and
their frequency. One such step could be the independent reconciliation of
bank accounts by an employee other than the one regularly assigned. One
correspondent account might be selected at random each month for
reconciliation by this other employee. A chart could be set up, showing this
step as item 1 and indicating what bank account was reconciled in the month
of January and by whom. This would give the part-time auditor assurance
that the accounts are being rotated and provide a record of what was
accomplished.
The next line could show another step, perhaps a cash fund rotation
schedule to be used for controlling the periodic exchange of funds among
tellers. Another might show who ran the various ledger cards for loans,
savings and the like each month (assuming that the system is not automated)
so as to insure that each is run by a different teller each time. Additional lines
would show how often the work should be done, who did it last and when.
This chart, maintained by the officer with the audit responsibility, has
several uses. It is an audit program, a scheduling chart and an assignment
record, and it takes the place of an audit report. For an outsider walking into
a bank to evaluate its audit program, this kind of record would be the most
descriptive and useful tool imaginable for providing a true picture of what the
program consists of. A program of this sort is possible and desirable for any
bank, regardless of size. It can be done with a minimum of effort and
expanded over a period of time, and will be very valuable in improving overall
audit effectiveness.
COMPUTERIZED RECORDS
Banks that have computerized records prepared by a service bureau or
another bank should not become too comfortable about having avoided many
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of the internal control problems discussed above. While the information
arrives in neatly prepared form, the data contained in these printouts are still
susceptible to teller manipulation and also may be open to unauthorized
manipulation by someone at the data center. The danger of an unauthorized
withdrawal by a teller is not lessened by a computer-maintained record, and it
might be possible for a service-center employee to open a legitimate account
at the bank and then transfer funds from other accounts to his own.
This is not an inherent problem for data-processing users. A data center
can also have segregated duties and an organizational plan of internal control.
However, there are probably many that do not, and a bank should find out
immediately whether the controls at a service bureau that it uses or
contemplates using are adequate. This is as much a part of the bank's internal
control as any other.
To obtain satisfaction that the necessary controls are in effect, the bank
may have to call in an expert with experience in independent evaluation of
EDP installation controls. A l l large CPA firms can and do perform these
evaluations. First, however, the bank should inquire of the servicer whether
such an evaluation has already been made by a qualified independent party. If
it has, a copy of the letter report on the facility may be available. This report
may provide the necessary satisfaction that controls are adequate, or it may
tell the bank where to look to make sure that any material weaknesses have
been corrected. Such an evaluation is not an absolute guarantee that no
problems exist, but, like many other approaches to internal control, it is a
reasonable method of insuring that at least adequate protection is afforded
through effective controls.
SUMMARY
The foregoing has perhaps dealt more with internal control than with
actual auditing, but the two are so closely related that they cannot
realistically be separated. Only through careful evaluation of controls and an
integrated auditing function, to make sure that the controls continue to exist,
can the financial stability of a bank be properly safeguarded and the financial
position and results of operations be accurately presented.
Auditing need not and should not be an uninteresting subject, because the
continuing understanding and evaluation of controls is not only a responsibility of management but can also be a source of great pride of
accomplishment if one has helped to strengthen the bank's controls and
prevent that potential defalcation that is of the utmost professional
embarrassment to any bank's management.
•

